Abstract-In many applications, transaction data arrive in the form of high speed data streams. These data contain a lot of information about customers that needs to be carefully managed to protect customers' privacy. In this paper, we consider the problem of preserving customer's privacy on the sliding window of transaction data streams. This problem is challenging because sliding window is updated frequently and rapidly. We propose a novel approach, SWAF (Sliding Window Anonymization Framework), to solve this problem by continuously facilitating kanonymity on the sliding window. Three advantages make SWAF practical: (1) Small processing time for each tuple of data steam.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many applications, transactional data are received as fast as tens to hundreds of millions of transactions per day. Examples of such applications include telecommunication, market-basket, network monitoring, and so on. These data typically contains customer data, not just transactions. As such, while the transactional data offer an opportunity to analyze and study customer behavior, the privacy of customers may be compromised either directly or indirectly.
For example, in a single day Amazon.com records several hundreds of thousands of online sales transactions, which are received in the form of streaming data. Suppose the sales transactions stream has the schema S(tid, name, gender, birthday, zipcode, telephone, goods). To analyze the customers' purchase behavior in a real-time manner, a mining algorithm operates on the sales transactional data streams continuously. To protect the privacy of customers, the attributes that explicitly identify the customers (such as name and telephone) are projected from the stream. However, in most of these cases, the remaining data may still be vulnerable to linking attack: the data can be used to re-identify individuals by linking or matching the data to other data sources. The Figure 1 illustrates an example where the customers can be identified From the above example, it is clear that we need a mechanism to ensure that transactions can be analyzed without violating the privacy of customers. In traditional (relational) databases, numerous techniques have been developed to protect privacy, such as perturbation-based methods [1] , [2] , [8] and k-anonymity [3] , [9] , [7] , [13] , [14] , [10] . Perturbation based methods for privacy preserving perturb individual data values or the results of queries by swapping [8] , condensation [1] , or adding noise [2] . The drawback of perturbationbased methods is that they impair the data integrity. Unlike perturbation-based methods, records of a k-anonymized dataset remain true. A dataset T is said to have k-anonymity property with respect to attribute set Q if each combination of values of Q in T occurs at least k times; here, the attribute set Q is termed as qusai-identifier attributes and can be used to link with external information. k-anonymity provides privacy protection by guaranteeing that each combination of values of qusai-identifier attributes Q will relate to at least k individuals when a linking attack occurs. The larger the value of k, the greater the implied privacy since no individual can be identified with probability exceeding 1/k through linking attacks.
However, these methods cannot be directly applied on streaming data. This is because streaming data is continuous, transient and usually unbounded. As such, memory is typically too small relative to the data size. Moreover, random access to the data is typically not possible. These characteristics and restrictions make it more challenging to achieve customer's privacy on data stream.
In order to emphasize recent data and to avoid storing potentially infinite streams in memory, data stream management systems may require some queries to operate over sliding windows. In the sliding window model, the system stores only the N most recent items (count-based windows) or only those items whose timestamps are at most as old as the current time minus T (time-based windows).
In this paper, we consider the problem of preserving the customers' privacy of transaction data streams in sliding window model. Our contributions are as follows:
• An approach, called SWAF (Sliding Window Anonymization Framework), is proposed to achieve privacy protection by continuously k-anonymizing the transactional data of sliding window.
• SWAF employs two efficient algorithms SK and IK, which may work in case of high-speed streams.
• Both privacy protection and data utility are considered in SWAF.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work that addresses the problem of privacy protection on sliding window of data streams.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some preliminaries and formally define the sliding window k-anonymity problem. Section 3 gives the detail of SWAF framework. Section 4 presents our experimental results from a prototype implementation of SWAF. Related works are reviewed in section 5 and section 6 concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. K-anonymity
An identifier attribute Q I is an attribute in table T that contains uniquely identifying information, such as the attribute name in figure 2 .
Definition 1: a qusai-identifier attribute set is a minimal set of non-identifier attributes that can be linked with external data to uniquely identify individuals An example of quasi-identifier attributes set is the attributes zipcode,sex and age from figure 2.
Definition 2: An equivalence block for a table T with respect to a quasi-identifier attribute set {Q 1 ,· · ·,Q m } is the set of all tuples in T that contain identical values {v 1 
Definition 3: A table T is said to satisfy k-anonymity (or to be k-anonymous) with respect to a quasi-identifier attribute set {Q 1 ,· · ·,Q m }, if each equivalence block of T contains at least k tuples.
As shown in figure 2, Table T* is a 2-anonymous relation of  Table T (derived by an For example, figure 3 (a),(b) and (c) are the possible domain generalization hierarchy for the attributes education, age and sex respectively. In figure 3 , both "Any" and "University" are value generalizations of "Bachelor". In particular, "Bachelor" is also considered as a value generalization of itself. figure 3 , tuple (University, Person, [1, 150] ) is a tuple generalization of (Bachelor, Female, [1, 40] ). Notice that one tuple may have multiple tuple generalizations. For example, both (University, Person, [1, 150] ) and (Bachelor,Person, [1, 150] ) are generalizations of (Bachelor, Female, [1, 40] ).
Definition 6: Given a data set T with qusai-identifier at-
With definition 6, two tuples that have the same values with respect to quasi-identifier attributes can be mapped to different tuple generalizations. 
C. Sliding Window K-anonymity Problem
Definition 7: A data stream S is an infinite time sequence with the incremental order S = {<s 1 
here s i is a tuple with sequence number p i , and
Sliding window always maintains the most recent part of data stream. As the new tuples continuously arrive in from data stream, sliding window replaces the oldest tuple with the new one. There are two kinds of sliding window, countbased sliding window and time-based sliding window. Our approaches can deal with both kinds of sliding window, for simplicity, we illustrate our work with count-based sliding window. The following is a formal definition of count-based sliding window.
Definition 8: Let <s n , p n > be the tuple that arrived in from a data stream S most recently, a sliding window SW l is a subset {<s n , p n >,· · ·, <s n−l , p n−l >} of S.
Definition 9: Sliding Window K-anonymity Problem. Given a sliding window SW l = {<s n , p n >,· · ·, <s n−l , p n−l >} and a quasi-identifier attribute set Q, produce a data set
1) ASW l satisfies the k-anonymity property with respect to Q; 
As the sliding window SW l is updated, ASW l is also required to be re-generated correspondingly.
In traditional (relational) database domain, k-anonymity algorithms are mainly concerned about both privacy protection and the utility of the anonymized data. In addition to these two goals, a k-anonymity algorithm for sliding window is required to work in a real-time manner, because the arrival rate of data stream is potentially high.
For example, an intuitive solution for the sliding window kanonymity problem can be that, as each tuples arrives in from stream, it executes the following two steps: 1) Update sliding window SW l ; 2) Perform an existed k-anonymity algorithm on the sliding window to generate ASW l ; However, perform k-anonymity is very time-consuming even in case of small data set. This approach is not suitable for high-speed data streams. Figure 4 shows an overview of our proposed SWAF framework. A key data structure in SWAF is a specialization tree, which is composed of a set of generalization node. SWAF works as follows. In initial stage, SWAF treats the sliding window SW as a static data set, and runs algorithm SK to get a specialization tree. As the sliding window is being updated, SWAF calls IK algorithm to continuously adjust the specialization tree. An k-anonymization ASW l for sliding window SW l can be directly derived from the specialization tree. Both SK and IK algorithms are devised for the purpose of privacy protection and information utility as well.
III. THE SWAF FRAMEWORK
This section is organized as follows. First, we introduce a general purpose metric InfoLoss to measure the quality of an anonymization. Second, we present the structure of specialization tree. Third, we propose a novel algorithm SK to initialize a specialization tree for a sliding window. Finally, we introduce how to k-anonymizing a sliding window continuously.
A. Information Loss Metric
There are a number of notions for measuring the quality of a k-anonymous data [3] , [5] , [7] , [10] , [11] in relational database domain. We adapt the general information loss metric LM presented by V.Iyengar in [7] to streaming data, which can be computed in a pipeline manner.
Let Q={Q 1 , Q 2 , · · · , Q m } be a set of quasi-attributes, and DGH i represents the domain generalization hierarchy for the attribute Q i respectively. For categorical attributes, given a value v in a DGH, the information loss of v is defined as follows.
V Inf oLoss(v)
Here S v is a set of leaf nodes of the subtree rooted by v in DGH, and S is the set of leaf nodes in DGH. Intuitively, the information loss of a leaf node in DGH is 0 and the information loss of the root is 1 according to the definition. For example, with the domain generalization hierarchy in Figure  3 (a), the information loss of value "University" is 1/2.
Hence we define the information loss of a tuple generaliza-
For example, with domain generalization hierarchies in figure 3 , given a tuple generalization g=<University,Female, [1, 40] >, the information loss of g is Inf oLoss(g) = 1/3 × (1/2 + 0 + 39/149) = 0.254.
Given an anonymized data set T, let G be the set of tuple generalizations used by T, and let F S(g) be the number of tuples that are anonymized by g for each g ∈ G . Then the amount of information loss of T is measured by the following formula.
Inf oLoss(T ) = g∈G (Inf oLoss(g) × F S(g))
Using the above formulas, we can calculate the amount of information loss of each tuple generalization node in the specialization tree. We also define a metric Info to represent the remaining amount of information of a generation node, and it is calculated using the following formula.
Inf o(g) = 1 − Inf oLoss(g)
Consequently, the remaining amount of information of an anonymized data set T is computed as:
B. Specialization Tree
Suppose that the quasi-identifier attributes are Q 1 ,· · ·,Q m , and DGH 1 , · · · , DGH m are the pre-defined domain generalization hierarchies on attributes Q 1 ,· · ·,Q m respectively. A specialization tree is defined as a directed tree where each node is a tuple generalization. The root node is the most general tuple generalization, that is, the value of its each attributes is the root value of the corresponding domain generalization hierarchy. If there is a directed edge from node u to node v in the specialization tree, it must satisfy the following conditions:
According to the domain generalization hierarchies shown in figure 3 , a possible specialization tree is shown in figure 5 . In the specialization tree, the children of a node u must split the same attribute domain of u. For example, in figure 5, the figure 5 , the ids for attributes education, sex and age are 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The nodes of the specialization tree have an attribute split-id to identify its split attribute. For the leaf nodes, the value of the split-id is set to 0. Each node g of specialization tree is The Information loss of nodes in specialization tree satisfy monotonic property, as shown in theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Given a specialization tree SP, for arbitrary two nodes g i , g j ∈ SP , if node g i is the parent or ancestor of node g j , then inf oloss(g i ) ≥ inf oloss(g j ).
Proof: Let Q = {q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q m } be a set of quasiidentifier attributes, and g(q i ) represent the value of g's q i attribute. According to the definition of specialization tree, if node g i is parent or ancestor of node g j , one of the following conditions must exist for each attribute q a ∈ Q:
is a value generalization of g j (q a ); Thus, for each attribute q a ∈ Q, V Inf oloss(g i (q a )) ≥ V Inf oloss(g j (q a )). Hence, inf oloss(g i ) ≥ inf oloss(g j ).
C. Initialize Sliding Window Anonymization
In the initial phase, SWAF considers the sliding window as a static data set and runs an off-line algorithm SK (Specialized K-anonymization) on it to obtain a generalization data set.
Let T be a data set to be anonymized, and its corresponding domain generalization hierarchies be DGHs. SPT is a specialization tree produced according to T. V denotes the nodes set of SPT. Then T can be anonymized by V, if the following conditions are satisfied:
1) ∀tuple i ∈ T , there is one and only one node g in V satisfied with tuple i ∈ FS(g);
2) ∀g ∈ V, |F S(g)| >= k, or |F S(g)| = 0;
Given the data set T, there would be numerous specialization trees that can be used to anonymize it. Our goal is to find the best one which loses the least amounts of information.
SK (r, FS(r))
1.
Generate candidate children nodes set S for node r 2.
FOR each nodes g in S 3.
Calculate |FS(g)| by scanning FS(r) 4.
If (|FS(g)| <k) 5.
delete g from S 6. ENDFOR 7.
IF (S is empty) 8.
return; 9. ENDIF 10. Divide S into partitions P 1 ,…,P m , the nodes those split node r on the same attribute belong to the same partition. 11. Get the best partition P i from P 1 ,…,P m. 12. FOR each node g in P i 13 .
Add g to r;
14.
Move the tuples of FS(r) that fall into g to FS(g).
15
.
SK(g, FS(g))
16. ENDFOR We devise a top down greedy algorithm SK to construct the specialization tree. According to theorem 1, a more specific generalization node loses less amounts of information than a less specific one. Thus, the basic idea of SK is pushing more tuples into the more specific generalization nodes's frequent sets. Figure 6 summaries the conceptual algorithm. SK starts the specialization tree construction with the root node r. All tuples of T are assigned into FS(r). First, according to the domain generalization hierarchies, SK generates candidate child nodes set for node r. For example, given the domain generalization hierarchies in figure 3 , the candidate child nodes set of node < Any, [ [1, 150] ), Female >, <Any, [1, 150] ), Male >}. Then, for each candidate child node g, SK calculates how many tuples in FS(r) fall into node g, that is, calculates the value of |F S(g)|. The nodes whose value of |F S(g)| is less than k are deleted from candidate child nodes set. Recall that the child nodes of node r must split it on the same attribute, not all the candidate child nodes are able to be added to r. We use a minimal infoloss heuristic to choose the appropriate child nodes for r from its candidate nodes set.
Minimal Infoloss Heuristic: For a node r and its candidate child nodes set {g 1 ,· · ·,g m }, the node set {g 1 ,· · ·,g m } are divided into several partitions p 1 ,· · ·,p n , in each partition the nodes split r on the same attribute. The nodes in partition p i are selected as child nodes of r, if it has minimal value of g∈pi
(Inf oloss(g) × |F S(g)|)+Inf oloss(r) × (|F S(r)| − g∈pi
|F S(g)|) among all the partitions.
Then, the selected nodes are added to r, and the tuples in FS(r) that can be further generalized by r's children nodes are moved to the corresponding child nodes' frequency set. For each child node of r, the procedure SK is recursively called until no child node could be further added to the node.
In the data stream system, memory is a critical resource. The key structure of SK algorithm is shown in Figure 7 . Each tuple t of sliding window has two extra attributes, one attribute is the flink that points to the next tuple who is in the same frequency set of a node of specialization tree with t, the other attribute is the glink that points to a generalization node of specialization tree that t belongs to. The tuples in a frequency set of a node of specialization tree are organized as a list using its flink attribute, so that it needn't allocate memory to a generalization node for storing its frequency set. Using this data structure, line 14 of SK algorithm is realized by carefully re-directing the tuples' flink and glink. There is extra overhead for storing two links of each tuple, however, it is typically small.
When the execution of SK is finished, a specialization tree is generated corresponding to an anonymization of the sliding window. For each tuple t of the sliding window, we can directly access to t's generalization through its glink attribute. 
D. Continuously Anonymize Sliding Window
A sliding window always maintains the most recent part of data of data stream. When a new tuple of stream arrives in, then sliding window is updated, and its corresponding anonymized sliding window also needs to be updated. Reconstruct the whole anonymized sliding window is unpractical because the process is time-consuming. In this section we introduce an efficient algorithm IK which solves this problem gracefully.
In IK algorithm, the key structure is also the specialization tree. As the sliding window is continuously being updated, IK adjusts the specialization tree to ensure that no node violates k-anonymity property.
IK Algorithm 1.
Insert the new tuple t new into sliding window; 2.
Search specialization tree from the root node until reach a node g, which is the most specific node that contains t new ; 3.
Insert t new into g's frequency set; 4.
If g can be added a child node, add a node to g; 5.
Delete the oldest tuple t old from sliding window; 6.
Delete t old from the corresponding generalization node g's frequency set. 7.
IF (|FS(g)|<k) 8.
IF (g is a leaf node) 9.
Collapse FS(g) to its parent node's frequency set and delete g; 10.
ELSE 11.
Pull a tuple from a g's child node into g, if this operation makes the child node violate k-anonymity, then recursively pull a tuple from child node to it parent node until no violation occurs or a leaf node reached; 12. ENDIF
ENDIF
Fig. 8. Definition of IK Algorithm
Each arrival of tuples from stream calls IK algorithm once. The update of sliding window involves two tasks, insert new tuple (say, t new ) into sliding window and delete the oldest one (say, t old ) from sliding window. For the tuple t new , it needs to be generalized. We search the specialization tree to find the most specific generalization node g that contains t, that is, g is a tuple generalization of t and no child node of g is a tuple generalization of t. Then, we insert t new into node g's frequency set. Notice that the insertion of t new possibly offers us an opportunity to improve the quality of the anonymization. We check the generalization node g, if it can be further added any child node without incurring k-anonymity violation, then we perform it.
When tuple t old is deleted from sliding window, it is also deleted from its corresponding generalization node g's frequency set. Node g has two possibilities after t old is deleted. One case is that |F S(g)| ≥ k, nothing need us to do. The other case is that |F S(g)| = k − 1, it means that FS(g) violates kanonymity property. If g is a leaf node, then we collapse g's frequency set to g's father node and delete node g. If g is a internal node, then we pull a tuple from one of g's child node's frequency set into g's frequency set. If this process makes the child node of g violates k-anonymity, then we recursively do this operation that pull a tuple from child node to its father node until no violation occurs or a leaf node reached. In each iteration, if a father node u has more than one child node, it selects a child node v from its child nodes to pull a tuple by applying rules: 1) |F S(v)| is largest; 2) Infoloss(v)-Infoloss(u) is minimal The first rule's goal is to quickly end the iterations, and the other rule's goal is to lose less information amounts brought by the pull operation.
The conceptual definition of IK algorithm is shown in figure  8 .
E. Discussion
In this section, we focus on the efficiency analysis of IK algorithm. In data streaming model, IK algorithm is required to be very efficient so that it can match the data stream arrival rate. Let Q ={q 1 , q 2 , · · · , q m } be a set of quasi-identifier attributes, and let h i be the height of domain generalization hierarchy DGH i of attribute q i . For simplicity, we assume that the degree of nodes in domain generalization hierarchies are same, say d.
Lemma 1: The height of a specialization tree H is no more
Proof: In a specialization tree, a leaf node that is in the possible highest level must be the node of which each quasi-identifier attribute value is a leaf value in corresponding domain generalization hierarchy, and each quasi-attribute value of the root node is the most general value in the corresponding domain generalization hierarchy. Recall that in a specialization tree the child node splits one and only one attribute domain of its parent node along the corresponding domain generalization hierarchy. Hence the height of the specialization tree
Lemma 2:
Let l be the size of sliding window. For each node g in a specialization tree,
Proof: Given a node g and a quasi-identifier attribute q i , let S qi be a subset of g's children nodes set, all the nodes in S qi split g in attribute q i . Then the maximal value of |S qi | is d. Each tuple of FS(g) must fall into one node of S qi , thus
There are at most k-1 tuples of FS(g) that fall into g's child node f, otherwise node f must have been added to node g, so
Namely, |F S(g)| ≤ d×(k−1), and it is clear that
The processing time of IK for each tuple is arbitrary, influenced by the data distribution of stream. Here, we analyze the time complexity of IK in the worst case.
Theorem 2: In the worst case, time complexity of IK is
Proof: In IK algorithm, except step 2,4,9 and 11, the other steps can be executed in O(1) time. In the worst case, step 2 needs search the specialization tree from root node to the leaf node in highest level, the time cost is O(H).
Step 4 needs scan FS(g) one pass, in the worst case, according to lemma
Step 9 can be processed in O (1) IV. PERFORMANCE STUDY We have implemented our SWAF framework and conducted extensive experiments on it. Our experiments are designed with two objectives in mind. First, we would like to verify the proposed method, SWAF, is able to anonymize sliding window of transactional data stream continuously while keep data's usability. Second, we expect to evaluate the effects of some key parameters of proposed algorithms on the quality of anonymized sliding window.
A. Experiment Setup
For these experiments, we used both real world data sets. We adopted the Adults data set from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository [4] , which contains data from the US Census and has become a benchmark for studying kanonymity. It consists of 6 continuous attributes, 8 categorical attributes. There are 45,222 records in the Adults database. We use 6 attributes of adults table that are described in figure 9 . The second data set is the sales transaction data set obtained from Jeff Corporation, which contains 151,246 tuples. We keep 5 attributes and omit the other attributes from the table. The details of these table are described in figure  9 . We used the same domain generalization hierarchies as [5] . The experiments were conducted on an Intel Pentium IV 2.4GHz PC with 512 MB physical memory.
B. Performance of SWAF
In this section experiment, Jeff sales transaction data set was used to simulate a data stream. The size of sliding window was set to 10,000, and the value k in k-anonymity is set to 50. We performed SWAF and reported the information loss amounts of anonymized sliding window every 10k tuples arrived. For comparison, we also ran SK algorithm on the sliding window in a off-line manner at each time that 10k tuples passed.
As is shown in Figure 10 , by SWAF the total information loss amounts of the 10,000 tuples in anonymized sliding window is no more than 2000, which is fairly low. As expected, the quality of anonymization generated by SWAF is worse than that generated by running SK in off-line manner. However, the difference of anonymization qualities is not high. Figure 11 reports the efficiency of SWAF. In the experiment SWAF ran SK algorithm on the first 10,000 tuples, and then continuously called IK algorithm to process the other tuples. As is shown in figure 11 , the execution time of SK is 0.51 second , and IK algorithm uses nearly 2 second for procssing every 10,000 tuples. That is, for each tuple the average processing time of IK is 0.2 ms.
From the experimental results, we can see that SWAF is 
C. Effects of Parameters
In this section, we would like to evaluate the effects of two key paramters, k (of k-anonymity) and sliding window size l.
First, we considered the effects of parameter k on the anonymization quality and SWAF's efficiency. As shown in figure 12 , the larger value of k is, the more information lose. This is because with larger value of k, it is more hard for SWAF to generate specific generalizations. As shown in figure  13 , SWAF performs more efficient in case of larger value of k. This is also because there are fewer nodes in specialization tree in case of larger value of k, and the height of specialization tree is low, which make IK run more efficiently.
We subsequently consider the effect of sliding window size l on the anonymization quality and SWAF's efficiency. As shown in figure 14 , the larger slidng window size l, the better anonymization quality is achieved. This is because more tuples in sliding window offer us high possibility to generate more specific generalizations to anonymize data. However, more specific generalizations produced means the specialization tree is high, which consequently decreases the efficiency of SWAF (as shown in figure 15 ).
V. RELATED WORK
Our work attempts to integrate two fields: data stream management and privacy preserving data management.
Data stream processing issues have received much attention in recent years. A data stream is a (real-time), continuous, sequence of data values. Some examples include sensor data, Internet traffic, financial tickers, on-line auctions and transaction logs. As such, it is not possible to store a stream on secondary storage in its entirety. Likewse, queries are typically long-running and standing, and new results are returned as new data arrive. To address the unique characteristics of data stream, researches have focused on continuous query processing, data stream mining and data stream management system. We refer readers to [6] for a survey.
In traditional database domain, the privacy preserving problem has been well studied in recent years. A variety of techniques have been proposed both to represent and mine the data without loss of privacy, including methods such as perturbation [1] , [2] , [8] , and k-anonymity [3] , [9] , [7] , [13] , [14] , [10] . Perturbation based methods for privacy preserving perturb individual data values or the results of queries by swapping [8] , condensation [1] , or adding noise [2] . The drawback of perturbation-based methods is that they impair the data integrity. Unlike perturbation-based methods, records of a k-anonymized dataset remain true.
K-anonymity provides privacy protection by guaranteeing that each combination of values of qusai-identifier attributes Q occurs at leat k times. The concept of k-anonymity was first proposed by P. Samarati and L. Sweeney in [11] , and after then many techniques have been proposed to address it, such as datafly [12] , Incognito [9] and TDS [5] . A. Machanavajjhala et al extended k-anonymity concept to the l-diversity concept, which requires l different values on sensitive attribute for each equivalence block that satisfied k-anonymity [15] .Our work can be easily extended to achieve l-diversity.
However, to the best of our knowledge,no existed work considered the privacy protection on the sliding window of transactional data stream context.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the problem of privacy preserving on the sliding window of transactional data streams. A novel framework SWAF (Sliding Window Anonymization Framework) was proposed to continuously facilitate kanonymity on the sliding window. Both theoretical analysis and experimental results showed that SWAF is effective and efficient.
